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I.

Introduction

The question of who qualifies as a minister and is therefore denied Title VII anti-discrimination
protections has been permitted to spiral out of control. At first, questions of applicability of the
ministerial exception turned on considering a multitude of factors in light of the role each religious
employee played. A religious institution’s right to choose its ministers is a great importance. A
minister is an individual tasked with furthering the religious mission, spreading the faith,
supervising and participating in religious ceremonies and rituals, all significant parts in the
framework of what a religious institution stands for.1 The Supreme Court has long recognized the
autonomy of religious organizations concerning the selection of their own religious leaders. The
ministerial exception, grounded in the First Amendment, precludes the application of employment
discrimination laws to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious
institution and its ministers.2 Expanding the definition of who and what constitutes a “minister”
places religious employees in a vulnerable position. And yet, in choosing to preserve the liberty of
religious institutions, to free them from government oversight and review, the judiciary has lost
sight of half of the equation in the religious employment context: the employees. Shielded by an
overbroad interpretation of what a minister is, the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. EEOC and Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, has done nothing
but tear down Title VII anti-discrimination protections while concurrently hiding religious
institutions behind a veil of “Free Exercise protections.”
In Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe, the Supreme Court adopted and revised a fourfactor test in a broad manner, resulting in a focus on an employee’s religious function, sufficient
to strip religious employees of virtually any Title VII anti-discrimination protections. The focus
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has strayed from the position’s title, it’s substance, how it’s held out to the world and instead turned
to a near exclusive consideration of function.3 How an employee functions within their role for
their religious employer is of paramount importance. The Supreme Court determined that teachers,
both lay and called, may be construed as ministers based particularly on how and what they do.
Any employee who leads a religious organization, conducts worship services or important
religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith, is considered a
minister.4 Prior to Hosanna-Tabor the ministerial exception had never extended to teachers.
Alternatively, religious schools would include morals clauses in employment contexts to permit
the institutions to fire teachers under the Title VII religious employer exemption. If a religious
school determined that a teacher acted contrary to the direction of their moral clause, they were no
longer considered to be in adherence to the institutions religious mission and could be fired outright
without the opportunity for redress. In Little v. Wuerl, the Third Circuit held that the Diocese of
Pittsburgh could discriminate on the basis of religion in decisions to hire or rehire teachers and
further choose to employ only those people whose beliefs and conduct were consistent with the
employer’s religious precepts.5
However, to permit unfettered discrimination against teachers and other employees with some
religious function, in direct violation of Title VII, flies in the face of reason. The adoption of the
Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe framework has had an enormous impact on
religiously affiliated K-12 education. Now, religious schools are likely able to hire and fire
teachers with impunity, given the general function of almost any teacher at a religious school is
geared towards exactly what Justice Alito believed the ministerial exception should include.
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The functional approach yields an overbroad interpretation of who qualifies as a minister.
While the functional approach prioritizes the functions of an employee over the three other
subverted factors, (title, title substance, how the employee holds that title out to the public), the
correct approach is the Sixth Circuit’s primary duties test, which provides religious employers
with sufficient free exercise protections. Because the Supreme Court’s function test yields an
overboard qualification of who qualifies as a minister, the standard must change and return to the
Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Hosanna-Tabor. Failure to do so will permit a continued destruction of
Title VII anti-discrimination protections.
Regardless of the above, the problems facing religious employees is multifaceted. The
ministerial exception, once it applies, regardless of test, places religious employers in a position
of absolute power over their employees. Further, a religious employer has the only say as to when,
where, and why to apply the ministerial exception notwithstanding the instances wherein
employees that the public would not construe as ministers nevertheless qualify under the
ministerial exception. Such unquestioned power, in tandem with the tests that yield an overbroad
reading of what constitutes a “minister” means that religious employers can intentionally
discriminate because there is never an inquiry about pretext. Without an inquiry about pretextual
decisions, religious employers may intentionally discriminate because pretext is no longer legally
redressable under the ministerial exception. The pretext inquiry would only exist in Title VII
litigation, which would normally proceed if the ministerial exception is not applicable. Because
the ministerial exception acts as an absolute barrier to pretextual considerations, entirely, the reach
of the ministerial exception must be limited so as to preserve the Title VII anti-discrimination
protections of religious employees.

4

II.

The Ministerial Exception and Determining Who is a Minister

A. Sixth Circuit Approach in Hosanna-Tabor
Cheryl Perich was first employed by Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church as a lay
teacher, but after completing her colloquy, she was accepted by the congregation and re-classified
as a “called” teacher.6 The distinction between each classification of teacher turns on acceptance
to and furtherance of the congregation’s religious mission of furthering the faith.7 Perich later
developed narcolepsy and was placed on administrative leave.8 Upon being cleared by her doctor,
she attempted to return to work, but was denied and subsequently terminated.9 The EEOC filed
suit on her behalf, claiming that Perich’s termination was in violation of the American’s with
Disabilities Act.10 Below, Hosanna-Tabor moved for summary judgment, invoking the ministerial
exception.11 The District Court granted summary judgment in the school’s favor.12 Here, the Sixth
Circuit adopts the primary duties test, which determines whether an employee qualifies for the
ministerial exception by considering if the primary duties are: furthering the religious mission,
spreading the faith, supervising and participating in religious ceremonies and rituals.13
The Sixth Circuit vacated the District Court’s determination that Perich was precluded from
pursuing her claim because of the “ministerial exception.”14 “The Court of Appeals recognized the
existence of a ministerial exception barring certain employment discrimination claims against
religious institutions—an exception “rooted in the First Amendment’s guarantees of religious
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freedom.”15 However, the Sixth Circuit did not believe that Perich qualified as a “minister” by
focusing on her duties as a teacher, which as a “called” teacher, were identical to a “lay” teacher.16
For the ministerial exception to bar an employment discrimination claim, two factors must be
present: (1) the employer must be a religious institution, and (2) the employee must be a ministerial
employee.17 First, to qualify as a religious institution, “the employer need not be a traditional
religious organization, such as a church, diocese, or synagogue, nor must it be an entity operated
by a traditional religious organization.18 Rather, a religiously affiliated entity is considered a
religious institution if its “mission is marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics.”19
Second, to qualify as a ministerial employee, the Sixth Circuit focused on the function or “primary
duties” of an employee.20 Under this view, an employee will be considered as a “minister” if “the
employee’s primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision
of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship.”21 Furthermore,
in ascertaining the true breadth of the ministerial exception, the Sixth Circuit focuses applicability
on the “function” of an employee’s position, but not as the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor
understood function to mean.
Up to this point, teachers at parochial schools that taught primarily secular subjects had never
fallen within the ministerial exception.22 Conversely, teachers that have been classified as
ministerial employees focused the majority of their work on primarily religious subjects or they
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had a central role in the spiritual or pastoral mission of the church.23 Here, the primary duties of
Perich’s position as a “called teacher” were identical to her previous role as a “lay teacher” which
gave the court pause to reconsider the District Court’s determination that the ministerial exception
applied. The Sixth Circuit, by applying the “primary duties” test, set a reasonable set of limitations
on the ministerial exception.
B. Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor
The Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s application of the “primary duties” test thereby
ruling that the ministerial exception in fact, did apply to Perich. Specifically, the Supreme Court
was hesitant to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when employees qualify as ministers but focused
on four factors that are now understood to be the four-factor test. The four-factor test considers an
employee’s title, the substance of that title, how the employee holds themselves out to the public,
and the employee’s function in their role.24 In that case, the Supreme Court focused on Perich’s
role as a “called” teacher, noting that she both held herself out as a “minister” of sorts while also
paying close attention to the title she was given. As a “called” teacher, the Supreme Court pointed
out that her titled changed to “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.”25
Perich’s title as a minister pointed to the additional steps necessary to obtain her diploma of
vocation.26 Previously, Perich’s duties as a lay teacher were determined to be identical to her
subsequent position as a called teacher, but the Supreme Court’s reasoning as to why the
ministerial exception should apply focuses on more than just her duties and instead on what she
was required to do in order to obtain this elevated status. Particularly, the Supreme Court focused
on the fact that Perich was required to participate in a significant degree of religious training in
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addition to a formal commission process.27 Perich was required to complete college-level courses
focused on church doctrine.28 Additionally, Perich sought out an endorsement of her local Synod
and went to great lengths to become a called teacher.29
In applying the ministerial exception’s four-part test, the Supreme Court noted that the court
below committed three errors, in failing to find that Perich was indeed a “minister” for purposes
of the exception.30 First, the Supreme Court found that Perich’s status as a commissioned minister
was relevant, noting that a title is not dispositive of the issue, but an ordination or commission is
certainly relevant, in tandem with the extensive religious training required.31 The Supreme Court
established that a religious employees’ title is relevant.32 Second, the Supreme Court determined
that too much weight had been given to the identical nature of the duties of both lay and called
teachers.33 Again, one single factor is not dispositive of the issue, although important, a religious
employee’s duties are not determinative of ministerial status. Third, the Supreme Court believed
the Sixth Circuit placed too much emphasis on Perich’s secular responsibilities.34 While the EEOC
argued that Perich’s mere 45 minutes of daily religious work should have dispelled any qualms
about her ministerial status, the Supreme Court disagreed, noting that “heads of congregations
themselves often have a mix of duties.”35 The EEOC believed that the ministerial exception
“should be limited to those employees who perform exclusively religious functions.”36
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Although the EEOC and Perich argued below that Hosanna-Tabor’s purported religious reason
to terminate Perich was pretextual, the Supreme Court disagreed, pointing to what the true purpose
of the ministerial exception is: to ensure that the authority to select and control who will minister
to the faithful—“a matter strictly ecclesiastical,” was left to the church.37 Justice Roberts pointed
out that this was not an inquiry about pretext.38 The ministerial exception applied to Perich because
“she played a substantial role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission . . .
it makes no difference that [Perich] taught secular subjects . . . the constitutional protection of
religious teachers is not [] diminished when they take on secular functions in addition to religious
. . . what matters is [Perich] played an important role as an instrument of her church’s religious
message.”39 Further, this case is a stark example of the court’s general hesitance towards
entanglement with religious organization decision making. Where a court would be “required to
make a judgment about church doctrine” such as the classification or duties of an employee, the
court will abstain.40 The opinion’s final words clarify the new test for ministerial exception
applicability, “[t]his conclusion rests not on respondent’s ordination status or her formal title, but
rather on her functional status as the type of employee that a church must be free to appoint or
dismiss in order to exercise the religious liberty that the First Amendment guarantees.”41
The EEOC and Perich argued that the ministerial exception’s broad reading will permit the
Church and religious organizations alike to undermine Title VII anti-discrimination laws.42
Subsequent cases proved that they were right. Specifically, the ministerial exception doctrine, postSupreme Court analysis and application, has welcomed unfettered discrimination wholeheartedly
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inconsistent with Title VII anti-discrimination purposes. Succinctly, the disproportionate weight
given to the function factor, which weighs the functions of a religious employee, adopted by the
Supreme Court, has destroyed anti-discrimination protections for a vast array of employees. Rather
than following the Supreme Court’s overbroad “functional status” approach of the four-factor test,
the Sixth Circuit’s “primary duties” analysis represents the correct means for determining who
qualifies under the ministerial exception. The Sixth Circuit approach provides adequate Title VII
anti-discrimination employment protections for religious employees concurrently with Free
Exercise protections for religious institutions.
C. Supreme Court in Our Lady of Guadalupe
Our Lady of Guadalupe serves as a prime example of the implications of the ministerial
doctrine, post-Hosanna-Tabor. In that case, the Supreme Court once again posed the question
whether the ministerial exception applies to teachers at religious institutions. Justice Alito’s
concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor replaces Justice Robert’s majority opinion as the new standard.
Whereas in Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court weighed each of the four-factors collectively with
a general focus on function, the Supreme Court now focuses solely on employee function and
mistakenly subverts the Sixth Circuit approach. Further, the importance of employee function has
been elevated, and the other three factors—title—title substance—how that title is held out to the
public—have been subverted. As a result, the ministerial exception has an arguably broader
application than it did before in Hosanna-Tabor.
In Our Lady of Guadalupe, the Supreme Court emphasizes that the applicability of the
ministerial exception must turn on the specific functions of a religious employee, as opposed to
how said employees are titled.43 The distinction between a lay and called teacher is no longer
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partially dependent on classification, but on what they actually do. Both a lay teacher and a called
teacher may qualify under the ministerial exception if their functions are identical. Consequently,
the Supreme Court makes a significant rewrite of the Hosanna-Tabor standard. Now, the
ministerial exception should apply to any employee that “leads a religious organization, conducts
worship services or important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher
of its faith.”44
Agnes Morrissey-Berru was employed by Our Lady of Guadalupe School (“OLG”), as a lay
teacher.45 Similar to Perich, Morrissey-Berru taught a mix of studies and her responsibilities
required religious and secular duties.46 Every year, Morrissey-Berru would enter an employment
agreement with OLG that included a specific provision requiring her to “develop and promote a
Catholic School Faith Community . . . [and that] all her duties and responsibilities as a teacher
were to be performed within this overriding commitment.”47 Further, Morrissey-Berru was advised
that the school would make its faculty decisions, guided by its Catholic mission, and that she
should be guided by that same religious mission.48 Similar to Perich, Morrissey-Berru led her
students in religious activity, and at every point was aware that failure in her responsibility to the
religious mission, would be grounds for termination.49 Morrissey-Berru was considered a
“catechist” and was called to intertwine Catholic doctrine with her daily teaching activities
evidenced by her participation and initiation of prayer in class. In 2014, OLG moved MorrisseyBerru to a part-time position and shortly thereafter, her contract was not renewed.50
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Morrissey-Berru filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) and then sued OLG for age-discrimination, claiming that she was not renewed in order
to permit OLG to hire a younger teacher.51 OLG maintained that its decision not to renew her
contract was solely based on her performance.52 Below, OLG successfully invoked the ministerial
exception, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, pointing to the Hosanna-Tabor framework which weighs
title and substance of the job in tandem when determining the functional status of an employee.53
In distinguishing Morrissey-Berru’s case from Perich, the Ninth Circuit noted that the former
lacked a “minister” title and further, that she had limited religious training and did not hold herself
out to the public as a religious leader.54
The second case of Kristen Biel is much the same as Morrissey-Berru’s. Biel served as a lay
teacher at St. James School, RC, as a long-term substitute and eventual full-time teacher.55 Similar
to Morrissey-Berru, Biel taught religion, participated in religious activity, and “imparted different
techniques on teaching and incorporating God” in class.56 Biel’s employment contract was nearly
identical to Morrissey-Berru’s, as she was required to further the religious mission of St. James
School and the Roman Catholic Church.57 Biel prayed with her students, prepared them for mass,
and emphasized Catholic doctrine, all in part to satisfy the school’s requirement that she infuse
faith into her classroom and daily teachings.58 Biel’s contract was not renewed, causing her to file
with the EEOC and sue St. James School, claiming that she was terminated for requesting a
medical leave, due to her bout with breast cancer.59
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Below, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s application of the ministerial exception,
once again pointing to the Hosanna-Tabor framework. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found that
the ministerial exception did not apply because “Biel lacked Perich’s credentials, training, and
ministerial background.”60 However, the Sixth Circuit’s primary duties test would have yielded a
cleaner result. The primary duties approach focuses on whether said duties consist of teaching,
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order or supervision or
participation in religious ritual and worship.61 Here, claims brought by Biel and Morrisey-Berru
would likely have succeeded under the Sixth Circuit framework. Both parties were teachers that
were tasked with spreading the faith, participating and supervising portions of religious worship.
But it cannot be said that the primary duties of Biel and Morrissey-Berru were akin to Perich in
Hosanna-Tabor. Further, because Morrissey-Berru and Biel were considered lay teachers, coupled
with occasional supervision and participation in religious worship, neither should qualify for the
ministerial exception.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on both cases and started its analysis with a clear
hesitance to engage in questioning the employment decisions of a religious institution. “The
Religion Clauses protect the right of churches and other religious institutions to decide matters of
faith and doctrine without government intrusion.”62 In the Supreme Court’s view, matters such as
these, akin to Hosanna-Tabor, should not be left to the court to decide, simply for the sake of
independence of religious organizations. While the Supreme Court was careful to point out that
religious institutions are not immune from secular laws, their autonomy is paramount, if and where
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possible.63 Specifically, they have the autonomy to choose who is employed, and on what terms.64
In the Supreme Court’s view, without the power to decide matters of “faith and doctrine” such as
employment of teachers at a religious school, the religious mission could be untethered by a
“wayward minister” and frustrate the purpose of a parochial school.65
However, Our Lady of Guadalupe is distinguishable from Hosanna-Tabor for several reasons.
In Our Lady of Guadalupe, we have two lay teachers working for a parochial school that lack the
specific training Perich had. Yet, Biel and Morrissey-Berru taught religion, led prayers, and went
to great lengths to infuse Christian ideals into their daily teachings. Although their status as
ministers is questionable, this case highlights the importance of employee function.66
The Supreme Court returns to Hosanna-Tabor, pointing out that Justice Thomas stressed that
courts should defer to religious organizations to determine who qualifies as a minister, in order to
appreciate and respect the right to choose who and why.67 Additionally, Justice Alito’s opinion
emphasizes that the application of the ministerial exception should focus on functions performed
by the religious employee, rather than labels,68 due to the slippery slope that would ensue if an
analysis of “minister” and its functional equivalents was required. Again, the Supreme Court
clarifies the Hosanna-Tabor decision by adopting Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor,
and thereby rewriting the ministerial exception standard. Now, “[the] ministerial exception should
apply to any employee who leads a religious organization, conducts worship services or important
religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.”69
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Things such as title are seemingly important, but not dispositive of the issue of ministerial
exception and its application.70 Biel and Morrissey-Berru lacked the minister title that Perich held,
and neither held themselves out to the world as ministers or leaders of their congregation or faith.
However, their actions as teachers, participating and leading classes in prayer, interjecting their
lessons with religious tenets of Catholicism, is of paramount importance to the Supreme Court.
However, the Supreme Court does not take their extensive religious training, or a lack thereof, as
significantly important. Rather, the Supreme Court presumes the purpose of a heightened
education in the faith as illustrating the needs of a religious organization to impart its mission
effectively.71
What matters most, is what an employee does, how they function within an institution. Things
such as teaching students in their faith, conducting worship services or rituals, and acting as a
messenger or teacher of that faith. Employee function is now the primary consideration of the
Supreme Court’s analysis, the Sixth Circuit factors previously relied upon are of minimal
importance. And the Supreme Court reasons as such, emphasizing that both Morrissey-Berru and
Biel qualify for the ministerial exemption under Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor.
Here, both teachers performed religious duties and were required by their employment agreements
to further the religious mission of the parochial schools at which they taught. Their “function”
within each parochial school mirrored exactly what Justice Alito emphasized in his HosannaTabor concurrence. Although both Biel and Morrissey-Berru taught secular subjects, they were
expected to intertwine Catholic ideals into their work, best illustrated by leading students in prayer,
preparing them for mass, and functioning as teachers of the faith. In reversing the Ninth Circuit,
the Supreme Court clarifies that the framework of Hosanna-Tabor was not meant to be construed
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as a “rigid formula” or “checklist” when considering such issues.72 Rather, the framework
emphasizes a holistic weighing of relevant factors, but stresses that special attention to the function
of the employee is paramount.
III.

How a Broad Reading of “Minister” Undermines Anti-Discrimination
Protections in Employment

A. Examples: Race, National Origin
An overbroad reading of “minister” has a deteriorating effect on Title VII anti-discrimination
protections. Although there have been no post-Hosanna-Tabor cases that deal with race, the
ministerial exception has previously been applied to issues of race discrimination. In Rweyemamu,
plaintiff Justinian Rweyemamu appealed the District Court of Connecticut’s decision that his Title
VII race discrimination claim was barred by the ministerial exception.73 Rweyemamu was a black
Catholic priest and served as parochial vicar of St. Bernard’s Church in Rockville, Connecticut.74
Rweyemamu applied to be parish administrator of St. Bernard’s, but a white priest was selected
instead.75 Rweyemamu argued that Bishop Cote failed to follow canon law and filed a claim with
the EEOC and Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”).76
The CHRO dismissed Rweyemamu’s claim based upon the ministerial exception and his
employment at the parish was thereafter terminated.77 Rweyemamu argued that the appeals court’s
recent decision in Hankins78 eliminated the ministerial exception79 in employment cases governed
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by Title VII.80 In that case, the Second Circuit clarified that Hankins’ claim was remanded, solely
to decide whether applying the ADEA to the church’s action violated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act. Hankins and the decision on remand was not based upon the ministerial
exception. Rweyemamu’s suit was also a case of first impression, as the Second Circuit had yet to
formally adopt the ministerial exception.81 The Second Circuit focused on Rweyemamu’s duties
as a Catholic priest and determined that any consideration of his claims would require
impermissible entanglement with religious doctrine. Interestingly, the court points out that it would
consider Title VII anti-discrimination cases for employees with a “lay” title, but not a minister.82
Therefore, Rweyemamu’s complaint was dismissed. The court’s reasoning, here, mirrors Justice
Thomas’ deference standard articulated in Hosanna-Tabor and speaks to Perich’s fear that an
overbroad reading of the ministerial exception will have destructive results.
Unlike race, national origin has been addressed in the post-Hosanna-Tabor era. In Sterlinski,
former music director Stanislaw Sterlinski, was barred from judicial review of his national originbased employment discrimination claim.83 In that case, Sterlinski was hired by Saint Stanislaus
Bishop & Martyr Parish as the Director of Music, in 1992.84 However, in 2014 he was demoted
from his position as director, to organist, and then terminated entirely.85 Sterlinski brought suit
against the Bishop of Chicago, claiming that he was discriminated against for being Polish.86 It is
important to point out that the position of “music director” has long been considered to be a
position falling within the context of “minister” and therefore, his case made it to court to
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determine whether an “organist” falls within the purview of the ministerial exception.87 The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that it did.
As a music director, Sterlinski had what the court considered to be “substantial authority” over
the conduct of religious services, noting in particular that music is a central part of masses.88
However, Sterlinski argued, to no avail, that as an organist, he no longer exercised the necessary
discretion over a central part of mass to thus enable him to act in a manner sufficiently in line with
the Hosanna-Tabor “functions” approach.89 Sterlinski argued that as an organist, he was merely
“robotically playing the music he was given” and could not be construed to be a minister.90 The
District Court disagreed, and granted summary judgment to the Bishop of Chicago, giving rise to
this Seventh Circuit appeal.
Cardinal Archbishop Cupich stressed the central focus that music has during Catholic mass,
pointing out that although Sterlinski was no longer the director, and thus not choosing music, his
position nevertheless qualified him for the ministerial exception.91 Sterlinski stressed that he was
not ordained, that “he just played music” and asked the court to determine “if an organist’s role is
sufficiently like that of a priest to be called part of the ministry.”92 Here, the court relied upon its
previous decision in Grussgot which similarly calls judicial review to focus on whether the
employee was serving a religious function.93 The Seventh Circuit mirrors the traditional court
hesitance to question religious organization’s choices, or entanglement theory. However, the court
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points out that a general “hands off approach” will prove problematic, by enabling religious
institutions to claim minister status for every conceivable employee.94
According to the court, the “answer lies in separating pretextual justifications form honest
ones.”95 The court points out that had Sterlinski truly been a mere “robot” in his duties as an
organist, the church still deserved to terminate him.96 For a church ought to decide such matters,
given the longstanding tradition and importance of music in mass.97 The court likens such a
position to a priest giving a monotone homily98 such that even if Sterlinski’s organ playing was
rote, it still played a central to advancing the faith just as an unenthusiastic homily would.99
While the Seventh Circuit might have feared entangling itself with the decision making of the
Cardinal Archbishop of Chicago, determining that an organist is the functional equivalent of a
minister flies in the face of reason. Because the Hosanna-Tabor framework calls for a primary
focus on the function of religious employees, cases are decided without considerations of the
employee. Although the question of pretext was not appropriately considered according to Justice
Robert’s opinion in Hosanna-Tabor, the Seventh Circuit’s seemingly logical determination that
an organist functions as a central part of ministry within the parish completely misses the point:
an overbroad reading of what constitutes a minister is detrimental to religious employees’ antidiscrimination protections. Rather than applying the Alito concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor, and
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later the opinion of Our Lady of Guadalupe, the Sixth Circuit primary duties test should have been
utilized. Once more, the decision here reflects Justice Thomas’ full deference standard in his
concurrence more than it follows Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor.
B. Examples: Sex, Disability, Age
Sex based discrimination claims fair no better, post Hosanna-Tabor. In Conlon, plaintiffappellant sought judicial review of her gender-based discrimination claim against her former
employer.100 However, like many before her, Conlon was barred from judicial review of her claim
because of the overbroad application of the ministerial exception. In that case, Alyce Conlon was
the spiritual director of InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA (“IVCF”).101 Prior to her
termination, Conlon informed her employer that she was contemplating a divorce and was placed
on administrative leave to save her marriage.102 The record shows that IVCF, as part of its religious
mission, “believes in the sanctity of marriage and desires that all married employees honor their
vows.”103 Further, IVCF encourages all employees experiencing martial issues to attempt to
reconcile with their spouse and specifically reserves the right to consider the impact any separation
or divorce by staff, may have on the students.104 Conlon alleges that she was fired in December of
2011, which predates her actual divorce in January of 2012 (somewhat semantically), for failing
to reconcile her marriage.105 Further, Conlon argues that several similarly situated male employees
that were in fact divorced, were neither disciplined nor terminated, and thus brings suit for genderbased discrimination.106
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Although IVCF was not a church, it was a Christian organization and was thus permitted to
claim the ministerial exception. The Sixth Circuit focused on the four Hosanna-Tabor factors: title,
the substance reflected in that title, use of that title by the plaintiff, and the important religious
functions performed for the Church.107
The Court found that Conlon met two of the four factors.108 As to religious training and use of
ministerial title, the Court distinguished Conlon from Perich. Conlon lacked the specific religious
training of Perich and did not hold herself out as an ambassador of the faith, as Perich did. But as
to title and function, the Court found similarities. As spiritual director, Conlon’s title conveyed the
appropriate religious meaning required under the Hosanna-Tabor framework. Additionally,
Conlon’s position had the same ministerial function as Perich.109
In this case, Conlon’s primary duty was to assist in the cultivation of “intimacy with God and
growth in Christ-like character” which the court unquestionably reasoned was a ministerial
function.110 Based on the presence of two of the four factors, the court looked to Justice Thomas’s
concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor, which requires that whenever a religious employer designates an
employee as a minister, the court should merely defer to the employer’s “good-faith understanding
of who qualifies as its minister.”111 The court declined to analyze Justice Alito’s concurrence
because it, in this court’s view, mirrored the fourth factor and therefore did not merit further
consideration.112 Instead, the court determined that where formal title and religious function are
present, the ministerial exception applies.113 Given IVCF’s status as a religious organization and
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Conlon’s status as a ministerial employee, her termination is not for the courts to reconsider.114 As
such, Conlon’s Title VII sex-based discrimination case was barred from judicial review.
Notwithstanding the unfortunate results of an overbroad reading of who qualifies as a “minister”
the court, here, is essentially viewing the four-factors test of Hosanna-Tabor with a visceral
hesitance to overstep and question how religious institutions go about classifying and defining
employees as “ministers.” In a way, the factors articulated in Hosanna-Tabor and Justice Alito’s
concurrence, emphasizing function, are seemingly quasi-subverted, in favor of Justice Thomas’
full deference standard.
The Second Circuit came to the same conclusion in Fratello.115 In that case, Fratello,
terminated as principal of St. Anthony School, appealed her gender-based discrimination claim.116
The Archdiocese of New York utilizes an administrative manual for all of its parochial schools to
delineate the duties of employees in the furtherance of its religious mission.117 Accordingly, the
Archdiocese maintains that the focus of parochial education is the “formation in the faith, for the
lived experience of Gospel values and for the preservation of Catholic culture, to train students to
live by their faith.”118 As the principal of St. Anthony’s, Fratello was described, as part per the
manual, as “having accepted the vocation and challenge of leadership in Catholic education.”119
Further, Fratello’s job description is significant: “the principal is the Catholic leader” and provides
“Catholic leadership by cooperating with the Pastor in recruiting . . . staff committed to the goals
of the sic school, in his religious ministry, monitoring the catechetical certification of teachers of
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religion” along with eight additional duties.120 At first glance, Fratello’s job description, duties,
and function are well within the Hosanna-Tabor framework.121
In this case, the Second Circuit points to an enduring hesitance of courts to question
religious organizations in the furtherance of their mission, specifically with regards to
employment. Citing James Madison, the Second Circuit opined that judicial review is incompatible
with religious doctrine in so far as it represents “an unhallowed perversion of the means of
salvation.”122 Relying on the four factors articulated in Hosanna-Tabor, the Second Circuit
emphasized that the primary focus of the court should be on the “functions performed by persons
who work for religious bodies” while paying close attention to the relationship between the
activities the employee performs and the religious activities that the employer practices.123
The court reasoned that because Fratello’s position as principal functioned as a ministerial
employee, her claim was barred from judicial review.124 The function of a principal at St.
Anthony’s such as carrying out the mission of the Catholic church, among various examples, was
unquestionably in favor of a determination that she qualified as a ministerial employee.
Specifically, the court reasoned that as part of her many duties, the main focus of Fratello’s work
was furthering the religious values at the school, fostering a Christian atmosphere, and so on.125 In
the court’s view, the fundamental consideration for ministerial employees’ qualification, was
undoubtedly present illustrated by both Fratello’s regular duties and her performance
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evaluations.126 Clearly, given the extensive circumstantial factors weighing in favor of a
ministerial employee classification, the Second Circuit determined that the Hosanna-Tabor
framework unquestionably meant her Title VII claim was barred from judicial review. The focus
on function, here, anticipates Alito’s opinion in Our Lady of Guadalupe.
The Hosanna-Tabor framework’s broad interpretation has yielded much the same results for
age-based discrimination cases. In Cannata, Philip Cannata brough suit against his former
employer, John Neumann Catholic Church and the Diocese of Austin, alleging that he was
terminated based on his age, in violation of both the ADA and ADEA.127 This was a case of first
impression for the Fifth Circuit, following the Hosanna-Tabor decision shortly before.128 Cannata
was the music director at St. John’s Neumann Catholic Church.129
Cannata argues, similar to Sterlinski, that the thrust of his position was to simply perform music
at Mass, maintain inconsequential ledgers, operate the sound system, and do custodial work as
necessary.130 According to Cannata, his position was one of entirely secular duties, to which the
court immediately notes that following Hosanna-Tabor, “the performance of secular duties may
not be overemphasized in the context of the ministerial exception.”131 Contrary to Cannata’s
position, the Diocese was of the well-established position that music plays an integral role in the
celebration of Mass, noting that here, all musicians “exercise a genuine liturgical ministry [in their]
collaboration with the pastor [to carry] out the Church’s mission.”132 Further, the Diocese provided
evidence that the music director has a major role during all services.133
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Cannata disputed his status as a ministerial employee, pointing to his lack of training,
education, and necessary experience to be considered a “worship leader” to no avail.134 The record
reflected that Cannata made unilateral decisions regarding music, designed to further the service
provided.135 In summation, the Court denied his claim, using similar rationale as the court in
Fratello. This decision anticipates Alito’s opinion in Our Lady of Guadalupe.
C. Examples: Sexual Orientation (Bostock Implications)
The ministerial exception’s applicability to claims of discrimination based on sexual
orientation has changed significantly. In Bostock, the Supreme Court was asked to consider a case
of first impression and determine whether Title VII applied to the LGBTQ+ community, in the
employment context.136 The law post-Bostock extends Title VII protections to now include
individuals that identify as homosexual or transgender.137 Now, “an employer who fires an
individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not
have questioned in members of a different sex.138 Sex plays a necessary role . . . in the decision,
exactly what Title VII forbids.”139
In this case, Gerald Bostock, Donald Zarda, and Aimee Stephens were all fired shortly after
revealing their status as gay, transgender, or pro-LGBTQ+.140 Each plaintiff brought suit under
Title VII alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex.141 However, the court decisions
below, varied by plaintiff.142 The Eleventh Circuit held, in Bostock’s case, that the law does not
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prohibit employers from firing employees for being gay.143 The Second Circuit held, Zarda’s case,
that discrimination based on sexual orientation falls under Title VII.144 The Sixth Circuit held, in
Stephen’s case, that Title VII bars employers from firing employees because of their homosexual
or transgender status.145
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock was based entirely on what Title VII says about the
common issue between these three cases: sex. Title VII prohibits employers from taking certain
actions “because of” sex, which the Court interpreted as but-for causation and potentially
“motivating factor” determinations.146 Now, an employer violates Title VII when they make
employment-based decisions, such as hiring or firing, based in part on sex.147 Here, the court
reasons that an employee’s status as homosexual or transgender is irrelevant to the employment
decision.148 Rather, it is precisely because an employer discriminates against an individual for
characteristics or traits that they would otherwise tolerate in another employee, that Title VII is
triggered.149 The Court, for example, points to an employer with two employees, both of whom
like men, but one employee is a man, the other a woman.150 If the employer then fired the male
employee for being gay, Title VII is triggered because the employee’s sex plays “an unmistakable
and impermissible role in the discharge decision.”151 Although, as Justice Gorsuch points out,
sexual orientation is not explicitly referenced in the text of Title VII, discrimination based on
sexual orientation cannot happen without discrimination based upon sex.152 The two are
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intertwined in this regard and therefore, Title VII anti-discrimination protections must extend to
LGBTQ+ status, or the purpose of the statute is moot.153 Ultimately, the Second and Sixth Circuit
decisions were affirmed, and the Eleventh Circuit decision was reversed and remanded.154
The implications of Bostock are vast and have had an immediate effect on ministerial exception
litigation. In Starkey, Lynn Starkey was a guidance counselor at Roncalli, a private Roman
Catholic school.155 Starkey’s employment contract was replaced with a guidance counselor
ministry contract, that required her to “convey and be supportive of Roman Catholic teachings.”156
After learning that Starkey identified as lesbian and was in a civil union with another woman, her
contracted was not renewed.157 Starkey filed suit against the Archdiocese and Roncalli, asserting
six claims, one relevant for this discussion: discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation under
Title VII.158 Roncalli argued that the First Amendment barred Starkey’s Title VII claims regardless
of whether she qualified as a minister.159 The District Court, following Bostock, held that such an
expansive reading of the First Amendment would render the ministerial exception superfluous.160
Further, the court points to sexual orientation as a protected status under Title VII.161 Therefore,
Roncalli could not rely on the ministerial exception to bar Starkey’s Title VII claims, as her status
as a minister was a question of fact to be decided later, and Starkey was free to pursue her Title
VII sexual orientation discrimination claim.162 This is one of the very first decisions post-Bostock
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and its decision has vast implications for what the future of ministerial exception litigation might
look like, in the context of Title VII sexual orientation claims.
IV.

What Would the Jurisprudence Look Like if the Sixth Circuit Test Were Used
in these decisions?

A. Sterlinski, Conlon, & Fratello: A Sixth Circuit Perspective
The implications of Title VII’s ministerial exception following Alito’s opinion in Our Lady of
Guadalupe are significant. The function test weighs the functions performed by a religious
employee and should now be understood to apply to “any employee who leads a religious
organization, conducts worship services or important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as
a messenger or teacher of its faith.”163 This approach has yielded broad interpretations of who
qualifies as a minister and thereby destroyed the fabric of Title VII anti-discrimination protections.
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit primary duties approach in Hosanna-Tabor is more than sufficient.
The primary duties test considers several factors to determine whether an employee qualifies as a
minister under the ministerial exception. Under this view, an employee is a minister if their primary
duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order
or participation or supervision of religious ritual and worship.164
What do an organist, principal, and spiritual director have in common? According to the
Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe framework, they’re all ministers. Here’s where the
distinction comes to life. In Conlon, Sterlinski, and Fratello, each decision turned on how the
aforementioned employees functioned in their roles, focusing on what they did for their employer.
However, each decision might be much different if the Sixth Circuit’s primary duties test were the
standard framework for considering what constitutes a “minister” in the employment context.
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If each case had been viewed under the primary duties approach, there is a serious question as
to how each plaintiff mentioned above was understood to teach the faith. None of the
aforementioned taught the faith under traditional conceptions of what it means to teach. Further,
teaching the faith was not among their primary duties. Spreading the faith, however, is a closer
question. Organizing and playing music during mass, running a parochial school, and acting as a
spiritual director are all aimed at some semblance of spreading the faith. But, not in the catechetical
or preaching sense. It very well might be that a primary duty of these positions was to spread the
faith, as articulated by the various employment contracts and guidance manuals. This would
arguably be a close call under the primary duties test, and because of the nature of each employees’
actions, it could potentially go either way, but it’s more likely in favor of an employee in this
context. Even if it were to weigh in favor of the employer, no one factor is dispositive of the issue
as the court pointed out in Hosanna-Tabor. The facts must be considered in light of each other,
and not on an individual basis.
Church governance, as one of the factors contemplated under the primary duties (of a religious
employee) test, is very likely to weigh against a religious employer, here. It is difficult to say how
these selected litigants could be construed to be acting in an official capacity such as church
governance requires. Selecting music for masses? Unlikely. Working with students to comprehend
and live their faith? Maybe. But if governance is to be understood as according to Black Law’s
dictionary as “applying policies, proper implementation, and continuous monitoring typically done
through or by an organization’s governing body” the question is not as close as it might seem.
Further, it is unquestionable that the primary duties of any of these plaintiffs included church
governance. Additionally, the supervision of a religious order or participation or supervision of
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religious worship and rituals is highly unlikely to weigh in favor of an employer. This particular
duty would almost always fall to a parochial vicar, not a principal, organist, or spiritual director.
At the very least, the primary duties test makes these cases closer than they were under the
function test. Because the question of what constitutes a “minister” is a closer issue, in these
examples there are significantly greater chances of judicial redress. These respective courts failed
to discern the distinction between what a minister is and is not because of an overbroad
interpretation of what a minister can be under the function test. In this “primary duties” alternative
review of these cases, there should be no question of the impact on church rights. But that should
not be construed as negative or in violation of Free Exercise protections. In this scenario, the
church is no longer free to discriminate without question. Although Justice Roberts says these
cases are not about inquiring about pretext, that might change. Religious institutions are still free
to make employment decisions as they see fit, but whereas such questions were almost never
reviewable, Title VII anti-discrimination protections would now be balanced against Free Exercise
protections, yielding a more equitable analysis. The ministerial exception, once it is determined to
apply by whatever test, gives a religious employer the absolute right to make the decision. There
is never an inquiry about pretext. Even if a religious employer intentionally discriminated against
an employee, it is not legally redressable. A pretext inquiry would only exist in Title VII litigation,
which could proceed only if the ministerial exception did not apply which is why limiting the scope
of the ministerial exception’s applicability is of the utmost importance.
B. What about in the teacher context?
The ministerial exception might have much the same effect under the Sixth Circuit approach.
The primary duties of a teacher in the parochial context would be a closer question, in terms of
whether the ministerial exception applies, but the analysis would entirely be focused on a case-
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by-case consideration. Distinguishing between a lay and called teacher would be unimportant as
the focus would turn on whether a teacher’s primary duties were to teach and spread the faith,
supervision or participation in religious ceremonies and not spending a significant amount of
time on religious instruction could mean that it’s not a “primary duty.”
V.

Conclusion
Consideration for who qualifies as a minister has been unnecessarily broadened to include

many employees that cannot and should not be classified as such. The Sixth Circuit correctly
determined the process by which employees should be construed and qualified as ministers. The
focus should turn on whether “the employee’s primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the
faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in
religious ritual and worship.”165 However, the Supreme Court incorrectly determined in HosannaTabor and later in Our Lady of Guadalupe that the function test, which weighs the employees
function within the employment context, is the appropriate analysis to determine whether an
employee qualifies as a minister. The Our Lady of Guadalupe function test has subverted important
considerations first pointed out by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor, such that now, an
employee’s title, its substance and how the position is held out to the public is virtually
insignificant. As a result, the Supreme Court has practically adopted Justice Thomas’ concurrence
in Hosanna-Tabor, which is nothing if not frighteningly dangerous for any notions of Title VII
anti-discrimination protections. Justice Thomas’ concurrence embodied the judicial hesitance
entanglement theory, which only stands to betray any conception of Title VII protections for
religious employees. Justice Thomas called for the ultimate form of deference, to simply let
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religious organizations choose who qualifies as a minister without question.166 If the overly broad
Our Lady of Guadalupe function test is allowed to survive, Justice Thomas’ deference standard is
all but inevitable.

166

Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 197‐199

32

